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Abstract 
Judicial review cannot serve as an effective check on administrative action unless aggrieved applicants 
have a real way to access the courts to obtain relief. In an admirable, albeit belated move, significant 
amendments were made to the Singapore Rules of Court to remove the procedural strictures inherited 
from the pre-1977 UK system. The amendments allow an applicant to seek a declaration in addition to the 
traditional prerogative orders and recover damages within the same proceedings if the applicant can prove 
that he/she would have had a valid claim in a private law action. This article examines the mischief that 
the amendments sought to cure, which stemmed from overly technical rules that hitherto plagued such 
applications. It is argued that the changes are underpinned by a desire to allow greater access to justice by 
facilitating the review process. In a bid to create a litigation-friendly environment, and having learnt from 
the UK experience, the Singapore rule makers eschewed aspects of the UK reforms. In so doing, the 
amendments have largely achieved their goals, but there remain areas of uncertainty to be resolved. This 
article examines possible further refinements to the procedures, bearing in mind the central philosophy of 
access to justice. 
 
1. Introduction 
On 1 May 2011, significant amendments were introduced to Order 53 of the Singapore Rules of 
Court,1 which sets out the procedure for judicial review applications against administrative action.2 The 
amendments were made via the Rules of Court (Amendment No 2) Rules of 2011 (the May 2011 
amendments). Two main changes were effected. First, Order 53 was amended to allow an applicant to 
seek declaratory relief under Order 53 in addition to one of the prerogative orders.3 Second, amendments 
were made to allow a court to grant an applicant who, having obtained one of the prerogative orders 
and/or a declaration, is also able to prove within those same proceedings that he/she has a valid cause of 
action in private law such that he/she would have been able to obtain the necessary reliefs had he/she 
chosen to take out a separate private law action. 
In fact, the reform story began some 30 years earlier. Order 53 of the Rules of Court was imported from 
and is materially similar to the UK Rules of Supreme Court Order LIII, before the latter was substantially 
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amended in 1977.4 The first part of this article will examine the procedural problems that plagued Order 
LIII and the nature of the reforms of 1977 that were designed to eradicate those difficulties. These 
problems continued to subsist in Singapore for some 30 years thereafter, until the May 2011 amendments. 
The second part of this article will critically examine the changes that were effected by the May 2011 
amendments to the Singapore Rules of Court. In particular, this article will highlight the considered 
approach by the Rules Committee to enhance access to justice by taking a litigant-friendly 
approach,5 particularly by increasing choices for litigants and reducing procedural hurdles in the judicial 
review application process. In particular, the article will focus on how the Rules Committee deliberately 
took a different approach from that taken in the UK reforms of 1977, in an attempt to sidestep the 
difficulties that have arisen in the United Kingdom because of the nature of those amendments. 
As the reform efforts undertaken in Singapore are still in their relative infancy, there is some latent 
uncertainty as to how it will be interpreted and applied by the courts. The last part of this article explores 
some of the uncertainties that a litigant may face in navigating the uncharted waters and looks forward to 
offer suggestions on how further refinements may be added to enhance access to justice for the would-be 
litigant. 
 
2. The Need for Reform 
Singapore inherited its legal procedures for judicial review from the UK system,6which, prior to 1977, 
had maintained the position that prerogative orders, being exclusively public law remedies, could not be 
sought within the same application for the private law remedies of the injunction and declaration.7 This 
dichotomy was problematic at several levels. First, as a matter of principle, the necessity of maintaining 
separate processes for private and public law remedies had to be called into question. The remedies that 
were available against administrative action were discrete and served different purposes, and the various 
remedies should have been treated on equal footing, with different remedies being appropriate on 
different occasions depending on the circumstances. The differing historical backgrounds and sources of 
origin of the remedies were hardly sufficient reasons to maintain separate procedural tracks.8 
 3 
 
 
Further, the practical impact of the bifurcated procedure on litigants was significant. Those who sought 
redress against administrative action were often faced with a dilemma as to which procedure to select, as 
the particularities of one public law remedy may have suited his/her needs in one respect, while another 
private law remedy may have been more appropriate to address the same factual situation in other 
respects. This was particularly so since the private law and public law procedural tracks were subject to 
different rules. For instance, under the prevailing UK rules at that time, an application for certiorari had to 
be made within 6 months and discovery was not available to the litigant, whereas a litigant seeking a 
declaration was not subject to any limitation period and could avail himself/herself of the discovery 
process. On the other hand, a declaration as a remedy may not have been adequate in every circumstance 
as it would have at most been a definitive statement of the correct position at law, without any 
concomitant compulsion or prohibition against the public body.9 A litigant would therefore have had to 
make an election as to which remedy would best suit his/her purpose at the outset and could not afford to 
utilize the wrong procedure or seek an inappropriate remedy.10 
These difficulties and other concerns prompted sweeping changes to the UK rules in 1977, which created 
a single application for judicial review, wherein litigants could seek any of the five remedies within the 
same application.11 Various provisions were also made to allow for pretrial interlocutory discovery, 
interrogatories, and cross-examination.12 In a triumph of substance over form, the amendments eliminated 
the procedural traps that a litigant seeking judicial review faced and allowed the litigant to focus on the 
substantive merits of his/her case. Lord Denning MR dramatically described the amendments as such: 
In 1977 the black-out was lifted . . . . The curtains were drawn back. The light was let in. Our 
administrative law became well-organised and comprehensive . . . it enabled the High Court to award 
damages and grant declarations. No longer is it necessary to bring an ordinary action to obtain damages 
and grant declarations. It can all be done by judicial review. This new remedy (by judicial review) has 
made the old remedy (by action at law) superfluous.13 
Somewhat curiously however, the same light did not shine through on the Singapore judicial review 
landscape until almost 30 years after. The Singapore courts stoically held on to the distinction between 
the procedures for public law remedies and private law relief, despite there being no express statement to 
like effect in Order 53, or its parent Act, the Supreme Court of Judicature Act.14 
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Thus, in Singapore, it remained the case until the recent amendments that an applicant had to proceed 
under Order 53 to seek a prerogative order and, in addition, had to take out an originating summons to 
seek a declaration under Order 15 rule 16, even if the particular act or incident in respect of which he/she 
sought the court’s intervention was the same as that which formed the subject matter of the judicial 
review proceedings under Order 53. A failure to comply with this cumbersome two-track procedure could 
lead drastically to a denial of substantive relief.15 
Moreover, the procedural hurdles an applicant faced were markedly different depending on whether 
he/she chose to take out an application under Order 53 or an ordinary action. An obvious example was the 
requirement of obtaining leave of the court, a filtering threshold that an applicant had to cross before 
being able to mount a challenge under Order 53, but which was absent from the ordinary private law 
procedure. The Order 53 process also had inbuilt limitation periods, which would not apply in an action 
by way of originating summons.16 There seemed little reason in principle to maintain such vastly different 
paths to obtaining judicial redress against the same administrative action. 
Acknowledging that the laws of Singapore were falling behind the times, the High Court, in Yip Kok 
Seng v. Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners Board,17 observed that other common law 
jurisdictions had already taken steps to update their judicial review procedural laws and hinted that it 
might be time for Singapore to do the same. 
 
3. Enhancing Access to Justice through Rule Amendments 
In answer to these calls for reform, amendments were made to the Singapore Rules of Court to streamline 
the judicial review procedure and address some of the concerns set out above. The main amendments 
made were as follows: 
(1) To allow applicants to seek declarations in addition to the prerogative orders at the first stage of 
judicial review proceedings; and 
(2) Once the declaration or prerogative orders have been obtained, to provide for a procedure to allow an 
applicant to seek damages or other private law remedies at the second stage of proceedings if the 
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applicant could prove that he/she had a valid cause of action such that the private law remedies sought 
would have been obtainable if they had been claimed in a separate action. 
In effecting these changes, no amendments were made to primary legislation, presumably on the basis 
that the courts were already vested with full power to grant both the prerogative orders18 and 
declarations.19 The amendments were meant to effect changes in the procedural law only; they did not 
amend the substantive law of judicial review. 
(A) Amendments to Allow an Applicant to Seek Declarations within Order 53 
Rules 1(1) and 2(1) of the amended Order 53 now read as follows: 
No application for Mandatory Order, etc., without leave (O. 53, r. 1) 
(1) An application for a Mandatory Order, Prohibiting Order or Quashing Order 
(referred to in this paragraph as the principal application) — 
(a) may include an application for a declaration; but 
(b) shall not be made, unless leave to make the principal application has been granted in accordance 
with this Rule. 
. . . . 
Mode of applying for Mandatory Order, etc. (O. 53, r. 2) 
(1) When leave has been granted to apply for a Mandatory Order, Prohibiting 
Order or Quashing Order— 
(a) the application for the order and any included application for a declaration must be made by 
summons to a Court in the originating summons in which leave was obtained . . .’ 
(Emphasis added) 
Order 53 rule 1(1) of the Rules of Court was amended to provide that an applicant ‘may include an 
application for a declaration’ in an application for one or more of the prerogative orders. This key 
amendment allowed an applicant to seek both prerogative orders as well as a declaration within the same 
proceedings. An applicant therefore no longer has to institute separate proceedings, one under Order 53, 
to obtain a prerogative order, and another under Order 15 rule 16 to obtain a declaration. 
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The manner in which the provision has been drafted entails that a litigant must first seek and obtain leave 
to commence an application for at least one of the prerogative orders. If leave is granted, the litigant can 
then also seek a declaration at the substantive hearing.20 Consequential amendments have been made to 
Order 53 rule 2(1) to provide that the application for a declaration must be made by summons in the 
originating summons in which leave was obtained. 
As is evident from the use of the phrase ‘may include’, the amended Order 53 rule 1(1) precludes an 
applicant from seeking solely a declaration by using the Order 53 procedure. It is suggested that this is 
evidence that, despite the amendments, the Rules Committee continued to view Order 53 as primarily a 
procedure to obtain public law relief. The amendments were simply to allow a declaration to be sought in 
addition to the public law remedies and were not intended to introduce a separate and alternative route by 
which to obtain a declaration, without other public law remedies, against a public body. 
(B) Amendments to Allow the Court to Grant Other Reliefs 
To the extent that the amendments were instituted to address the mischief identified by the courts in 
relation to the overly rigid technical rules on how an applicant had to begin his/her action, the 
amendments described above would have been sufficient. The Rules Committee, however, took the 
opportunity to streamline even further the procedural route by which an applicant could obtain relief, by 
also allowing him/her (once he/she had successfully obtained the prerogative order(s) and/or declaration 
sought) to seek private law remedies such as damages and restitutionary reliefs within the same 
proceedings if he/she could satisfy the court that he/she had a valid cause of action in private law such 
that he/she would have been entitled to those reliefs had he/she begun separate proceedings under private 
law. 
In this regard, the newly inserted rule reads as follows: 
Power of Court to grant relief in addition to Mandatory Order, etc. (Order. 53, r. 7) 
(1) . . . [W]here, upon hearing any summons filed under Rule 2, the Court has made a Mandatory 
Order, Prohibiting Order, Quashing Order or declaration, and the Court is satisfied that the applicant 
has a cause of action that would have entitled the applicant to any relevant relief if the relevant relief 
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had been claimed in a separate action, the Court may, in addition, grant the applicant the relevant 
relief. 
(2) For the purposes of determining whether the Court should grant the applicant any relevant relief 
under paragraph (1), or where the Court has determined that the applicant should be granted any such 
relief, the Court may give such directions, whether relating to the conduct of the proceedings or 
otherwise, as may be necessary for the purposes of making the determination or granting the relief, as 
the case may be. 
(3) Before the Court grants any relevant relief under paragraph (1), any person who opposes the 
granting of the relief, and who appears to the Court to be a proper person to be heard, shall be heard. 
(4) In this Rule, ‘relevant relief’ means any liquidated sum, damages, equitable relief or restitution. 
Before the insertion of this rule, an applicant who had successfully obtained a prerogative order would 
have had to institute separate proceedings in order to obtain the reliefs available in private law, such as 
damages or restitutionary remedies. To have continued requiring the applicant to do so would have 
resulted in the unsatisfactory situation whereby amendments would have been effected to allow 
declarations to be sought within the framework of Order 53, but not other consequential private law 
remedies such as damages even after the court had recognized that there had been wrongful conduct on 
the part of the public authority. Such a distinction would have been indefensible. With the May 2011 
amendments, such relief can be sought within the same proceedings under the Order 53 framework. This 
amendment echoes the post-1977 UK reforms.21 
Post-amendment, Order 53 rule 7(2) of the Rules of Court further grants the court full power to give the 
necessary directions for the conduct of the proceedings or otherwise, as appropriate, in particular to obtain 
the relevant evidence that is necessary for the court to grant and assess the damages sought, or grant any 
other civil law remedies claimed. This amendment was necessary as, unlike the wide range of 
interlocutory procedures that are applicable for applications begun in a private law action, the procedural 
framework under Order 53 is not designed to cater to the taking and management of the (documentary 
and affidavit) evidence that is necessary for the court to adjudicate on a claim for a civil law remedy. 
Such processes were therefore deemed necessary, for example, for the court to determine issues of 
remoteness of damages or issues of admissibility and authenticity of evidence pertaining to 
damages.22 This is yet another example of the May 2011 amendments’ focus on creating a litigation-
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friendly atmosphere, although some uncertainties linger about the extent to which the full suite of 
interlocutory reliefs is available. 
While streamlining the process by which aggrieved applicants could seek redress through judicial review, 
the rule makers were also keenly aware of the concomitant need to provide an avenue for the assertions of 
any affected third parties to be ventilated. Order 53 rule 7(3) now provides that before the court grants 
any relevant relief, the court must hear any person who opposes the grant of such relief. Given that an 
applicant may now seek other reliefs if he/she successfully obtains one of the prerogative orders or a 
declaration under Order 53, without commencing a separate action (which would have given formal 
notice of his/her claim for such reliefs), it is therefore necessary and procedurally fair for a party opposing 
the grant of such reliefs, or for example, the Attorney-General, to be given the opportunity to be heard by 
the court before such relief is granted. At the same time, in so far as the procedure also allows the parties 
and the court to be in possession of all the necessary evidence before the claim is adjudicated upon, the 
amendments ensure that any enhancement of procedural access for the applicant is not at the expense of 
the fairness of the substantive outcome. 
(C) Points of Departure from the UK Reforms 
In addition to stripping the procedural laws of its vestigial antiquities, a process that largely mirrors the 
UK reform efforts, there are also a few specific areas where the Singapore rule makers had consciously 
departed from their UK counterparts. This illustrates how carefully considered and well-crafted rule 
amendments are critical to achieving the desired legislative ends. Residual ambiguities in the detailed 
rules or any ambivalence in the general purport of the rule changes would have heightened the risk of 
satellite litigation, running counter to the objective of bringing about greater access to justice in the first 
place. 
In this connection, it is argued that a careful examination of the manner in which the Singapore rule 
amendments were effected reveals a deliberate attempt to avoid any uncertainty of characterization as to 
whether an action is of a public law or private law nature to justify utilization of the appropriate process. 
In particular, the way the amended Rules were drafted made it clear that the amendments were not 
intended to preclude the applicant from seeking a declaration via Order 15 rule 16 of the Rules of 
Court, even if the issue was one of public law. The amended Order 53 was instead meant to offer 
an additional option for the litigant, who wished to obtain both the prerogative orders and a declaration. 
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The manner of reform signals a clear departure from the position taken by case law in the United 
Kingdom on the interpretation of the post-1977 Order LIII of the UK Rules of Supreme Court. 
The amended UK Order LIII had led to confusion and a raft of satellite litigation on the criteria to 
determine whether a claim should be brought by way of judicial review rather than as a private law 
action.23 The genesis of the confusion was the ruling of the House of Lords in O’Reilly v. Mackman, 
which was followed in Cocks v. Thanet DC,24where it was held that, as a general rule, it was contrary to 
public policy and an abuse of process to permit an applicant to proceed by way of ordinary action where 
the applicant was ‘seeking to establish that a decision of a public authority infringed rights to which 
he/she was entitled to protection under public law’.25 In the Courts’ view, this was because an applicant 
would in so doing evade the safeguards inherent in the UK Order 53 procedure. However, Lord Diplock 
accepted that there were limited exceptions to this general rule, particularly where the invalidity of the 
decision arose as a collateral issue in a claim for infringement of a private right or where none of the 
parties objected to the adoption of the procedure by ordinary originating process.26 
The position taken by the House of Lords created great uncertainty as to the distinction between public 
and private law, and the applicability of the collaterality exception.27 Since the decision in O’Reilly v. 
Mackman, the preponderance of case law seems to be in favour of allowing proceedings involving public 
law issues to be litigated under the ordinary originating processes, provided that some private law right is 
also being asserted.28 Happily, it can also be argued that the distinction in procedure between judicial 
review proceedings and ordinary actions has been diminished with the advent of the UK Civil Procedure 
Rules.29 
The approach taken in Singapore, in contrast, was to simply open up to the applicant the option of seeking 
a declaration under Order 53 provided that he/she was also seeking at least one of the prerogative orders. 
There was no corresponding amendment to Order 15 rule 16 in order to close this other already-existing 
route to seeking a declaration. Accordingly, post-amendment, an applicant who wishes to seek a 
declaration can choose which procedure he/she wants to adopt. His/her decision would likely depend on 
the nature of his/her claim and the remedies he/she would like to obtain. It is left to the applicant to assess 
which procedure is most practically advantageous to him/her, without having to first consider the 
intricacies of case law on how his/her action should be characterized so as to determine the correct 
originating procedure. 
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To further facilitate access to justice, the amended Order 53 rule 1(1) does not require an applicant to 
obtain leave to seek a declaration under the judicial review procedure. This parallels the position under 
Order 15 rule 16, wherein an applicant is not required to seek leave of court in order to commence an 
ordinary private law action to obtain a declaratory judgment. In so doing, the amendments are designed to 
be deliberately litigant friendly, as it would have been open for the Rules Committee to treat the 
declaration as being on par with the other prerogative orders and require that leave be granted before the 
applicant is allowed to make the substantive application to obtain a declaration. This additional hurdle is 
not present in the current architecture of the rule. Arguably, this approach is also right in principle, since 
the question of whether a threshold requirement of obtaining leave of court ought to apply should be 
dependent on the nature of the relief being sought, as opposed to the form of the originating process by 
which the action is instituted. 
Having said that, even though leave of court is not required for seeking a declaration in the judicial 
review proceedings, the requirement nevertheless still applies to the application in relation to the 
prerogative orders being sought. The consequence of this is that, if an applicant were to commence a 
claim under Order 53, seeking both the prerogative order(s) and a declaration, but then fail to obtain leave 
to make his/her substantive application for the prerogative order(s), his/her claim would end there. 
However, he/she would still be able to commence a claim using the ordinary originating process to seek a 
declaration from the court. This is not as surprising as it first seems, as even prior to the amendments, the 
applicant would have had the opportunity to avail himself/herself of the ordinary originating process even 
if his/her claim under Order 53 failed. The difference now is that he/she would have the opportunity to 
seek a declaration twice, in two separate proceedings. 
In yet another departure from the UK 1977 reforms, the procedural framework under the Rules of Court 
would appear to envisage a situation where the applicant can, at a subsequent stage after having filed 
his/her application for judicial review, seek additional private law remedies. In notable contrast, the UK 
rules of 1977 provided that the court could only award damages in an application for judicial review if the 
applicant had included in the statement in support of his/her application for leave a claim for damages 
arising from any matter to which the application for judicial review related.30 The Singapore amendments 
therefore not only give an applicant the additional option of seeking private law reliefs in the same 
judicial review proceedings but also provide him/her with the flexibility of deciding at what stage he/she 
wants to seek such additional reliefs. While obviously facilitative of the aggrieved applicant’s seeking of 
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the appropriate redress, the extent to which a proper balance has been struck between the interests of the 
applicant and the public body respondent will be queried below. 
 
4. Uncharted Waters 
While the amendments have done much to update, clarify, and streamline the procedural rules governing 
judicial review, there are a number of important issues that may still require consideration by the Rules 
Committee and the courts. As with any legislative reform, the rule changes may not always be all-
encompassing ones, and there will often be gaps to be plugged or uncertainties to be resolved. The 
amendments may thus have to be subsequently fine-tuned and calibrated, or judicially interpreted and 
explained, as they are applied in practice to achieve their desired objectives. This section highlights a few 
areas that may require judicial clarification or further amendments in the future in order to further 
enhance access to justice for the would-be litigant by ensuring not only the adequacy of final reliefs but 
also the availability of suitable recourse to ancillary and interim orders at a pretrial or prehearing stage. At 
the same time, the rules should not be interpreted or applied in such a way as to be solely concerned with 
promoting access for the applicant, without any regard for the interest of respondent public bodies to be 
sufficiently prepared in meeting the judicial review challenges. Furthermore, while the rule changes are 
certainly favourable to the aggrieved applicant, an increase in the number of available options of recourse 
may also bring about new questions for litigants and their lawyers to consider. 
(A) Uncertainty as to the Applicable Pretrial Interlocutory Procedures 
To a large degree, the uncertainty as to pretrial interlocutory processes already existed before the 
amendments and is inherent to the Order 53 framework. Admittedly, it is not the case that there is an 
absolute dearth of prescription as to the applicable interlocutory procedures in judicial review 
proceedings. For example, Order 53 rule 3 specifies the manner in which further affidavit evidence may 
be produced before the court upon the hearing of the substantive judicial review application.31 
However, the extent to which the panoply of usual pretrial interlocutory procedures that are applicable in 
ordinary private law proceedings also applies in judicial review proceedings has never been clear. As the 
court highlighted in Yip Kok Seng v.. Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners Board: 
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. . . It is not clear whether certain processes applicable to ordinary originating summons, such as 
disclosure, are applicable in addition to those prescribed under O 53. An applicant seeking both 
prerogative and ordinary remedies is obliged to proceed via two separate originating processes, and again 
it is not clear whether subsequent consolidation is possible.32 
(i) Disclosure 
In the area of disclosure, there is at least some judicial guidance. The most recent pronouncement on the 
law in Singapore was set out in Lim May Lee Susan v. Singapore Medical Council,33 where the High 
Court found that, despite there being a lack of clarity in the case law of both the United Kingdom (pre-
1977) and Singapore as to whether disclosure was available in judicial review proceedings, such 
disclosure should, in principle, be available.34 The Judge relied on the phrase ‘any party to a cause or 
matter’ in Order 24 rule 1 to find that judicial review proceedings should be included as well.35 The 
Judge, however, made clear that the nature and extent of the disclosure in judicial review proceedings 
would be different from that of ordinary proceedings, because in judicial review proceedings, the court 
was not called upon to make findings of fact based on evidence but rather determine whether the action 
being challenged ought to be quashed or prohibited, and so on. The court’s role being limited to review, 
the amount of disclosure necessary would also be correspondingly limited. 
After the May 2011 amendments, it can be argued that Order 53 rule 7(2) entails that disclosure will have 
a wider application, at least at the second stage of the judicial review process where private law reliefs are 
being sought.36 This is because the limited role that the court plays in respect of judicial review 
proceedings, as highlighted by the Judge in Lim May Lee Susan v. Singapore Medical Council, would no 
longer be applicable in the context of the court deciding whether to award a private law relief. Instead, the 
court’s power to order disclosure would arguably be akin to its power to order disclosure in private law 
proceedings. Logically, Order 24 of the Rules of Court, which governs the disclosure obligations of 
parties in private law actions, would therefore be instructive as to the extent of the court’s powers to order 
disclosure under Order 53 rule 7(2). 
There may be some latent uncertainty, however, due to the fact that Order 53 rule 7(2) does not make any 
direct reference to Order 24. Instead, it is drafted very generally to give the court the power to ‘give such 
directions, whether relating to the conduct of the proceedings or otherwise, as may be necessary for the 
purposes of making the determination or granting the relief’. This is in contrast to the 1977 UK 
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rules,37 which specifically define an ‘interlocutory application’ in judicial review proceedings as including 
‘an application for an order under Order 24’. 
The impact of the comparative silence in the Singapore Rules of Court on the disclosure obligations of the 
parties is unclear. In particular, are parties meant to comply with the narrower obligation under Order 24 
rule 1,38 in which parties are only required to disclose documents that directly affect their case or that of 
another party to the action, or the more onerous obligation under Order 24 rule 5, which encompasses a 
broader concept of discoverable documents, which is extended to include not just documents relevant in 
and of themselves but also documents that would lead the applicant on a ‘train of inquiry’ to documents 
that may be relevant?39As this is not made clear in Order 53 itself, it is presumably for the parties to seek 
the court’s directions as to the extent of their disclosure obligations. It is suggested that the court should 
have the full power under Order 53 rule 7 to order disclosure in the same way that it does in any ordinary 
originating summons, which would include the broader scope of discovery in the sense envisioned 
by Peruvian Guano, as this would give full effect to the intent behind the amendments, which must be to 
allow the procedural mechanism of judicial review to be equally effective and efficacious as ordinary 
private law proceedings in resolving conflicting allegations of facts for the purpose of determining 
substantive private law reliefs. 
If that is true, a further related question is whether the wider disclosure obligations at the second stage of 
the judicial proceedings (i.e. at the stage where private law relief is being sought) will have any impact on 
the more limited disclosure obligations at the first stage of the proceedings (i.e. at the stage where the 
prerogative order(s) or declaration is being sought). Conceptually and in theory, there should be a clear 
distinction between the two stages, with the court only having the power to impose more extensive 
disclosure obligations on the parties at the second stage of proceedings when private law reliefs are being 
considered. Yet, it is easy to envisage a situation where the court, already knowing that the applicant is 
likely to obtain the prerogative order or declaration sought, and knowing that the applicant would then 
require the court to adjudicate on his/her entitlement to private law relief, feels compelled to save time 
and resources by ordering the relevant and necessary disclosure at the earlier stage of the proceedings. 
Parties must thus be prepared to open their cupboards from a very early stage in proceedings. 
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(ii) Necessity to Plead 
The analysis above assumes that the court knew at a very early stage in the proceedings that the applicant 
would be seeking additional private law relief under Order 53 rule 7. However, it is an open question 
whether the court and the respondent public authority have the ability to acquire such knowledge given 
that the applicant is not required to pray for such relief in the originating summons under Order 53 rule 
140 or the summons under Order 53 rule 2.41 The current drafting of the provision would suggest that the 
respondent bears the risk of being caught by surprise and having to immediately defend a private law 
claim, having just lost in the public law part of the proceedings. 
From the applicant’s perspective, however, the provision gives him/her more than just a tactical 
advantage. Lack of prescription on pleadings means that an applicant does not risk his/her claim for 
private law relief being struck out due to the relief not being pleaded. As mentioned above, this is another 
example of a concerted effort being made during the May 2011 amendments to reduce the procedural 
hurdles faced by the applicant. 
Similar concerns apply in respect of the application for a declaration under Order 53 rule 2. As 
highlighted above, leave of the court under Order 53 rule 1 is not required in order to make an application 
for a declaration. Order 53 rule 1 also does not require the applicant to state that, should he/she obtain 
leave to make an application for the prerogative order(s) he/she seeks, he/she also intends to make an 
application for a declaration. This means that the respondent and the court will only be made aware of the 
applicant’s intention to seek such relief at the time that the summons under Order 53 rule 2(1), which 
contains the principal application, is served. 
The concern that the respondent public authority may be caught by surprise is mitigated to a certain extent 
by the insertion of Order 53 rule 7(3), which states: 
(3) Before the Court grants any relevant relief under paragraph (1), any person who opposes the granting 
of the relief, and who appears to the Court to be a proper person to be heard, shall be heard. 
Thus, the respondent and any other proper party retain the right to be heard before the private law relief 
may be granted. Yet, although a right of hearing is afforded, this may not be sufficient to eradicate the 
concern that the public authority would not have adequate notice of the nature of the private law claims, 
as well as the bases for and factual allegations in support of such claims, in advance of such a hearing. It 
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can be argued that it would have been preferable if the amended rules had specifically prescribed the 
filing of affidavits setting out all grounds of relief being prayed for, which should be served on all 
affected parties. 
(B) Differing Standards under Order 53 and Order 15 Rule 16 
Before the May 2011 amendments, the level of protection that the Rules of Court afforded the public 
authority depended on the type of relief being sought. To quickly revisit, if the applicant was seeking a 
prerogative order, leave of the court was necessary, which would serve as a filtering mechanism to ensure 
that the authority is called upon to justify its actions only if the applicant crosses a certain threshold. On 
the other hand, if a declaration was being sought under Order 15 rule 16, leave of the court was not 
necessary, and the fast and expedited ordinary originating summons procedure was a quick and effective 
means by which an applicant could obtain recourse.42 
Although the May 2011 amendments preserve the position that applications for declarations do not 
require leave of court, in practice, an applicant seeking a declaration under Order 53 would have to 
surpass the leave threshold under Order 53 rule 1 before his/her application for a declaration under Order 
53 rule 2 can get off the ground. This means that there is some degree of disparity between the procedures 
to obtain a declaration under Order 15 rule 16 and Order 53, when viewed from the perspective of the 
applicant. 
The practical effect of this disparity is that the applicant (and his/her lawyers) must, from the outset, be 
clear and strategic about the manner in which he/she commences his/her action and the precise nature of 
the reliefs required to obtain redress. While the May 2011 amendments may have made it more attractive 
for applicants to proceed under Order 53, there may be circumstances in which seeking a declaration 
under Order 15 rule 16 is more appropriate. This could be where, for example, the applicant needs an 
immediate remedy and a declaration by the court is sufficient to address his/her needs. In this regard, it 
should be borne in mind that, even after a declaration is obtained under Order 15 rule 16, a private law 
action for damages can still be mounted subsequently. 
(C) Continued Unavailability of the Injunction 
The court’s powers under Order 53 rule 7 are expressly made subject to the Government Proceedings Act 
(GPA).43 The provision was made subject to the GPA in order to make clear that the court could not 
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purport to grant any relief contrary to the GPA, given that section 19(c) of the Interpretation Act prohibits 
the making of subsidiary legislation under an Act that is ‘inconsistent with the provisions of any 
Act’.44 Of particular importance is section 27 of the GPA, which prohibits the granting of an injunction 
against the Government. The impact of section 27 of the GPA is that, despite the rule amendments, it is 
still not possible for a court to grant an applicant an injunction against the Government under Order 53 
rule 7. In contrast, in the United Kingdom, judicial review proceedings are excluded by section 38(2) of 
the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 from section 21 of the same Act, which prohibits the granting of 
injunctions against the Crown. Further, the 1977 reforms allowed injunctions to be claimed in 
applications for judicial review, and this was given statutory force in section 31 of the Supreme Court Act 
1981.45 This carve-out provision is absent from the GPA. In fact, the definition of ‘civil proceedings’ in 
section 2(2) of the GPA was amended in 1997 (via the Statutes (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1997) 
to specifically include proceedings for judicial review and this was not reversed by the May 2011 
amendments. Hence, injunctions continue to be unavailable against the Government. 
This issue, in a sense, can be seen as unfinished business on the part of the lawmakers. On the one hand, 
the argument could be made that Parliament should be slow to allow injunctive orders to be made against 
the Government as such remedies would be anathema to the efficient workings of Government. Of 
particular concern is the fact that interim injunctions may be ordered against the Government to preserve 
the status quo between parties pending the final determination the proceedings. There is an argument to 
be made against impeding the Government’s ability to put in measures or make decisions promptly in the 
public interest, especially in circumstances where the claim may be entirely unmeritorious. Further, it 
may be argued that it would serve no purpose to bring in injunctions under Order 53 since an applicant 
can simply commence an application for a prohibiting order and/or a mandatory order under Order 53. 
On the other hand, it is clear that a mandatory order and/or prohibiting order, which cannot be granted on 
an interim basis, does not address the situation where an applicant needs to immediately compel (or 
prohibit) the Government to carry out an act. An applicant with a meritorious claim would have no 
recourse until he/she has cleared the hurdle imposed by the leave stage and then has gone on to complete 
the substantive proceedings. While both arguments are compelling, one would have thought that 
preserving this exceptional treatment of the Government by shielding it from injunctive orders is at odds 
with the general philosophy of promoting access to justice, which underpins the amendments. Moreover, 
even if interim injunctive relief becomes an available option against the Government, the courts would 
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still act as the necessary check against unwarranted applications for interim injunctions that could hamper 
the Government in the legitimate discharge of its functions. A full debate on the desirability of interim 
injunctive relief against the Government is beyond the scope of this paper, but these are real concerns that 
may warrant a reconsideration of section 27 of the GPA at the appropriate time. 
It is also not clear whether the phrase ‘injunction’ within the meaning of the GPA is wide enough to 
encompass stays of execution of executive orders as well. This is a vexed matter that has received 
extensive judicial treatment in the United Kingdom, without any clear resolution.46 If it is the case that a 
stay of execution against an executive order does amount to an injunction, the implication is that such 
stays cannot be ordered against the Government because of section 27 GPA. The impact of this is 
significant. The applicability of Order 53 rule 1(5), which provides that the granting of leave to apply for 
judicial review shall, if the Judge so directs, operate as a stay of proceedings in question until the 
determination of the application or the Judge so orders, would be narrowed considerably. By way of 
illustration, it would mean that the court would be unable to direct a Government agency to hold its hands 
on carrying out a decision, for example, to revoke a hawker’s licence, even as the hawker takes out a 
judicial review application to challenge the legality of that decision. Any judicial clarification of this area 
would be welcome. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Much has been done to update the procedural law that governs judicial review applications in Singapore. 
In removing legal technicalities and archaic distinctions, a litigant-friendly approach was clearly taken 
and a deliberate decision made to enhance access to justice for the applicant as far as possible. An 
applicant can now seek a declaration and one or more of the prerogative orders under a single 
consolidated procedure under Order 53. Having obtained these remedies, he/she can also seek private law 
reliefs if he/she can convince the court that he/she has a valid private law cause of action against the 
public authority. These reforms are welcome and have done much to clarify and streamline this hitherto-
complicated area of procedural law. The Singapore reforms in this area of judicial review, underpinned by 
the central philosophy of access to justice, have illustrated how legislation, particularly in the area of 
procedure, needs to be well crafted in order to create a comprehensive and coherent infrastructure to 
ensure that substantive relief can be effectively sought. Inevitably, legislative reforms and rule changes 
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bring new questions of interpretation as well as uncertainties in application. This article has sought to 
identify a number of such areas that still require some judicial elucidation or perhaps even future 
refinement when the opportunity arises. 
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